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  Although the GATT compliance record is mixed, this study finds consistent evidence that 
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Variance decomposition analysis reveals larger and quicker impacts in prices of non-
fundamental shocks originating from other markets.  Results make a stronger case for more 
reforms in the current revisitation of the Agreement. 
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1 Paper presented at the 2000 AAEA Annual Meeting, July 30 to August 2, 2000, in Tampa, Florida 1. Introduction 
The historic Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) accomplished what has 
eluded the GATT for a long time, that of putting trade in agriculture under the same umbrella of 
disciplines as that of other sectors (e.g., manufacturing).  In particular, it aimed to dismantle 
trade-distorting policies through the introduction of disciplines that included ensuring and 
expanding market access, and limiting domestic support and export subsidy.   
With the end of the six-year implementation period and the start of its revisitation this 
year, the GATT compliance record so far is mixed at best.  Despite the conversion of non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) into tariff equivalents that were to be cut by 24 to 36 percent, and MAV insured 
access at a minimum of 3 to 5 percent of base consumption, “dirty tarriffication” limited the 
reduction in effective protection.  Although AMS declined by 40 percent, which is much higher 
than the 13 to 20 percent required in the URAA, support under the “green-box” increased by 54 
percent.  With all these shortcomings, did GATT make any difference in agricultural trade at all? 
Studies on the impact of GATT is abundant in the literature.  However, they have mostly 
focused on the impact of GATT on economic activities such as production, consumption, trade, 
and prices (Brester and Wohlgennant (1997), Fuller and Hayes (1998)).  However, very scant 
attention has been given on the impact of GATT in improving the functioning of institutions 
such as the world agricultural commodity markets.  The reforms introduced by GATT are 
institutional (i.e., changes on “rules of the game”) in nature.  The impact on economic activities 
in some sense is secondary since it largely relies on the institutional change aspect of GATT.   
This is where this study departs from earlier studies.  In particular, this study examines 
whether GATT reforms improved market integration and efficiency using the beef and wheat 
markets as specific cases.  Market integration is defined similar to McNew and Fackler (1997), that is in terms of the degree shocks arising in one market price are passed on to other market 
prices.  On the other hand, the concept of market efficiency is more narrowly defined in terms of 
the speed at which market prices adjust to departures from their equilibrium relationship.  
The world beef market is used as a specific case because the pre-GATT regime of beef 
trade was highly protected with measures that impeded market integration and efficiency that 
were subject to reforms under the URAA.  The wheat market is used to examine whether the 
same pattern of institutional impact in meat can be observed for crops.  Wheat is a highly traded 
commodity with world trade representing 20 percent of world wheat production.  Moreover, 
similar to beef the pre-GATT period, wheat trade was subject to substantial distortion with 
subsidized wheat exports.  
The URAA disciplines radically changed domestic and trade policies of several countries 
that are significant players in the world beef market.  The EU, the fourth largest beef importer of 
the world ended its variable levy in beef, allowed tariff quota of 161 tmt at an in-quota rate of 20 
percent, and limited export subsidy to 822 tmt until 2000.  The U.S. replaced its quota under the 
Meat Import Law with a TRQ of 657 tmt.  Japan, the second largest importer of beef in the 
world, abolished its beef import quota in a 1990 agreement and replaced its base rate of 93 
percent to 50 percent bound rate effective in 1995 to further decline to 38.5 in the year 2000. 
Mexico the sixth largest importer liberalized its imports of fresh/chilled/frozen beef import since 
January 1994, courtesy of the NAFTA agreement, and full liberalization of beef variety meats 
will follow by 2003.  Although South Korea, the seventh largest importer, is fully liberalizing 
their beef imports only by 2001, the share of the more market-oriented Simultaneous Buy-Sell (SBS) system is increasing - expected to capture 70 percent of South Korea’s 206 tmt import 
quota this year.2  
  The major change in the wheat market was the limit imposed on subsidized EU wheat 
exports.  From the high EU wheat export of 20 mmt in the early 1990s with a large portion of it 
subsidized, it had to operate within the maximum allowable subsidized wheat export of 16.8 mmt 
in 1998/98. 
2. Model 
  This study also departs from earlier studies on GATT in the methodology used.  Whereas, 
earlier studies had to specify some general or partial equilibrium structure, this study employs 
time series methods with minimum structural specifications and allows the associative behavior 
(i.e., correlation structure) of the data to “speak-for-itself”. 
Several studies have used used the concept of cointegration to test for market integration 
such as Goodwin (1992), Goodwin and Grennes (1994), Benson et al. (1994a), and Silvpulle and 
Jayasuriya (1994).  McNew and Fackler (1997), however, questioned the appropriateness of the 
use of the presence and number of linear long-run relationship of a cointegrating vector as an 
indicator of market integration.  This study uses innovation accounting to directly measure 
market integration.  This method allows direct measurement of price variability and its 
decomposition to the various sources of variability from the variability of all other prices in the 
system.  The test for market efficiency is based on the speed of adjustment and the elasticity 
implied in the cointegrating vector.  
Dynamic price behavior of a given market can be represented by [1]  
                                                        
2 Another feature of the world beef market that impeded on market efficiency is its segmentation into the Pacific 
and Atlantic beef market, where the latter represents beef trade among countries where foot-and-mouth disease 
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where Yt is a vector of endogenous prices; N is the lag length; Bi is a conformable coefficient 
matrix; and µt is a vector of primitive exogenous disturbances with distribution µ ~ N[0, Σ ].  To 
avoid identification problems the VAR model is used as a reduced form of [1], i.e., 
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  There are three possible reformulations of the VAR model in [2] to adequately handle the 
particular stationarity property of a given price vector Yt.  To choose the appropriate model, 
consider a reparameterized version equivalent to [2], i.e., 
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where  Γ i = f(Ci) and  Ψ  = ( I - C1 - C2 - . . . - CN ).  
  If the rank of Ψ  is full then using levels in [2] presents no statistical problem.  On the 
other hand, if the rank of  Ψ  is zero then a difference version of [2] is adequate.  However, if the 
rank of Ψ  is 0 < r < N then the ECM in [3] is the appropriate model.  If [2] is used, then any 
statistical test is suspect, while if a difference version is used, then misspecification error is 
committed by ignoring the long-run term.  
The dynamic relationship of prices is fully captured by the three terms of the RHS of [3].  
Moreover, the specification lends easily to disaggregating the impact of fundamentals on the 
level of prices and impact of unexpected shocks on price variability.  The impact of 
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the Pacific market, while Argentina and the EU are the major players in the Atlantic market. fundamentals on the level of prices is captured in the long-run relationship represented by 
1 − Ψ t Y .  The parameter ψ  can be expressed as  β α ′ = Ψ , where β′  is the cointegrating vector 
such that β′ Yt-1 (i.e., equilibrium error) is stationary, and α  measures the speed of adjustment 
from past equilibrium errors.   
On the other hand, the impact of unexpected shocks on the variability of prices is 
captured by the innovation vector υ t.  Consider a VMAR representation of the VAR, i.e., 
[4]  YF L tt = () ν , 
where L is a lag operator, FL I CLL G () [ ()] =−
− 1  and  νυ tt G = − 1
.  G is the Choleski 
decomposition of Σ .  An ith equation of [4] is  
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   The total variability of the price vector can now be decomposed into its various sources.  
The unconditional variance of yit can be easily derived from (5), i.e., 
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where σ i2 is the variance of the innovation of the ith variable.  Let Pr(Y  I(T-r)) be the optimum 
r-step-ahead predictor of Y given all information up to T-r.  Based on equation [5], the forecast 
for the ith good is  
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Then the forecast error is the difference between (5) and (7), i.e., 
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variability of yit can also be examined in terms of the forecast error variance, which is equal to 
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This expression is standardized in [10] to facilitate interpretation and comparison. 










































Each RHS term captures the proportion of the variability of yi due to the respective 
variability of the variables in the vector.   
3.  Empirical Implementation and Results 
  Data used in this study are monthly beef and wheat prices from the International 
Financial Statistics covering the period June 1986 to April 1998.  Beef prices are for frozen beef 
in U.S. dollar per pound.  U.S. beef price is FOB New York, while Australia and Argentina beef 
price are CIF in U.S. East Coast port.  Wheat prices are in U.S. dollar per bushel.  U.S. wheat 
price is hard red winter wheat FOB Gulf of Mexico ports, while Australia wheat price is Wheat 
Board export price.   All estimation was done using RATS for Windows version 4.3. 
The price variables were first tested for nonstationarity to select the most appropriate 
representation of the model.  The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (ADF) is used for this purpose.  
Each price series is assumed to have a data generating process that is adequately described by a 
univariate version of model [3] with varying assumptions about the intercept and trend.  Table 1 
shows that all the price series for beef and wheat are nonstationary.  That is, since in many of the 
cases the absolute values of the test statistics are lower than the critical values at 10 percent 
significant level, we can not reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity .  This means that the 
individual price series can wander away with no tendency to revert back to their mean.   However, there may be an equilibrium relationship that governs their comovements over 
time such that departures from this equilibrium condition are temporary.  This might occur 
because economic forces at play provide an internal tendency for these variables to revert back to 
their equilibrium level.    
 The existence of an equilibrium relationship of beef prices and wheat prices was first 
examined by testing for the presence of a linear combination of the prices that are stationary 
using the Johansen Maximal Eigenvalue and Trace of Stochastic Matrix method.  The Pacific 
beef market price equilibrium was tested for the U.S. and Australia beef price.  Table 2 shows 
that the Johansen test suggests two cointegrating vectors between the Australia and U.S. beef 
price in the pre-GATT period and one cointegrating vector in the post-GATT period.  The 
Pacific-Atlantic beef market price equilibrium was tested for the Australia and Argentina beef 
price.  The Johansen test suggests one cointegrating vector between the Australia and Argentina 
beef price in the pre-GATT period and two cointegrating vector in the post-GATT period.  The 
same result is shown for the long-run relationship of the Australia and U.S. wheat prices.  Since 
the result on the number of cointegrating vector is mixed for the pre-GATT and post-GATT 
period, the study proceeded by imposing only one cointegrating vector in all cases.  
Very strong evidence was found that GATT disciplines promoted market efficiency in 
both the world beef and wheat markets, despite reported maneuvers by many countries to 
frustrate the true intent of the URAA.  Table 3 shows that within the Pacific market, the 
fundamental relationship of Australia and U.S. beef price significantly improved with the long-
run transmission elasticity implied in the cointegrating vector increasing from 0.243 in the pre-
GATT period to 0.289 in the post-GATT period.  More importantly, however, is the significant 
improvement in the speed of adjustment which increased from 0.309 to 0.609, respectively.  That is, when the U.S. and Australia beef prices departed from their long-run equilibrium relationship, 
the Pacific beef market has become more efficient under the GATT regime in the sense that the 
speed of adjustments back toward an equilibrium have doubled under the post-GATT regime. 
Also, this speed of adjustment parameter is very significant with t-ratio of 4.  Even the 
fundamental relationship of beef price between the segmented Pacific and Atlantic beef market 
improved significantly.  In the pre-GATT period, the trade policy distortions and segmentation 
of the market may have corrupted the price transmission between the two markets at –0.065.  
GATT reforms corrected this inverse relationship with a price transmission elasticity of 0.07, and 
increased the speed of adjustment by 2.4 times from 0.246 to 0.592.  The lower transmission 
elasticity even under GATT in the Pacific-Atlantic beef market compared to the within Pacific 
market may be explained by the continuing segmentation of the two markets, which might have 
even been strengthened under the GATT agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  
However, the increasing across-market beef trade between the U.S. and Russian Federation, 
Argentina and the U.S. in more recent years may explain the significant improvement in the 
speed of adjustment.  The same results in the beef market are repeated in the wheat market.  That 
is, the fundamental relationship of Australia and U.S. wheat price significantly improved with 
the long-run transmission elasticity implied in the cointegrating vector increasing from 1.020 in 
the pre-GATT period to 1.075 in the GATT period.  The speed of adjustment also increased from 
0.064 to 0.414.  
Furthermore, the variance decomposition analysis shows that there is greater degree of 
market integration in the post-GATT period as evidenced by the more widespread and faster 
transmission of price variability across prices in both the beef and wheat markets.  The long-run 
maximum proportion of the variability of the U.S. beef price that is explained by the unexpected shocks of the Australian beef price has increased from 14.53 percent in the pre-GATT regime to 
25.95 percent in the post-GATT regime (see table 4).  Moreover, the speed at which the 
unexpected shocks in the Australian beef price are reflected in the variability of the U.S. beef 
price has improved significantly under the GATT regime.  Whereas the maximum share of 14 
percent is not reached until the 10
th-step-ahed-forecast in the pre-GATT regime, the maximum 
share of 25 percent in the post-GATT regime is already reached as early as the 2
nd-step-ahead-
forecast.  Also, the long-run maximum proportion of the variability of the Australia beef price 
that is explained by the unexpected shocks of the U.S. beef price increased from 14.52 percent in 
the pre-GATT regime to 45.93 percent in the post-GATT regime.  However, the speed at which 
the unexpected shocks in the Australian beef price are reflected in the variability of the U.S. beef 
price has slightly slowed down from 100 percent of the maximum share reached in the 5
th-step-
ahed-forecast in the pre-GATT regime to only 90 percent of the maximum share is reached in the 
same forecast in the post-GATT regime.  The same significant improvement in the transmission 
of price variability can be observed in the case of wheat price.  The maximum share of shocks in 
the Australia wheat price to the variability of the U.S. wheat price doubled from 20 percent in the 
pre-GATT regime to 43 percent in the post-GATT regime (see table 5).  The same can be said 
for the maximum share of shocks of U.S. wheat price on the variability of the Australia wheat 
price which more than doubled from 19 to 46 percent.  Whereas the maximum share is attained 
slowly in the pre-GATT regime for both prices, the post-GATT regime shows faster transmission 
of price shocks in the wheat market. 
A slightly different interpretation of the variance decomposition analysis shows that there 
is more price simultaneity under the GATT regime suggesting better integration of markets in 
both beef and wheat.  In the pre-GATT regime 85 percent of the variability of the U.S. and Australia beef price were explained by their own variability.  This own-share decreased to 74 and  
54 percent, respectively, in the post-GATT regime.  It is also shown that while their degree of 
exogeneity was almost the same in the pre-GATT regime, the Australia beef price became more 
endogenous in the post-GATT regime.  This is consistent to the fact that Australia can be 
considered as the residual supplier of beef in the world with a share of 43 percent of total world 
net beef trade in 1998.  Australia’s beef net export in 1998 was 1187 tmt compared to a net 
import of 205 tmt for the United States. 
The same pattern in the result is repeated in the case of wheat, where in the pre-GATT 
regime 80 and 81 percent of the U.S. and Australia wheat price, respectively, were explained 
their own variability.  Both prices showed greater endogeneity in the post-GATT regime with the 
share of their own variability accounting only for 57 and 54 percent of their respective 
variability.  
4.  Summary and Conclusion 
While the GATT revisitation has been bogged by many issues, the central question to 
raise is "Did GATT make a difference?"  
  Although studies on GATT are abundant in the literature, this study departs from them in 
both subject-matter and methodology.  Whereas, earlier studies examined the impact of GATT 
mostly on economic activities, this study focused on the institutional impact of GATT, 
particularly on market integration and efficiency.  Whereas, earlier studies had to specify general 
or partial equilibrium structure in their models, this study used time series methods with 
minimum structural specification.  
The world beef and wheat markets were used as specific cases to examine the impact of 
GATT reforms on market integration and efficiency.  Major importers and exporters of beef in the world were significantly impacted by the reforms under GATT.  The same can be said in the 
case of the world wheat market.  
The impact of GATT on market integration and efficiency was analyzed using 
cointegration and innovation accounting to capture the degree and speed of transmission of 
shocks in both the fundamentals and innovations.   
  An ADF test showed that all the beef and wheat prices are nonstationary.  Cointegration 
test suggests that a long-fun equilibrium exists for beef prices within the Pacific beef market, 
between the Pacific and Atlantic beef market, and the wheat market.  The study found very 
strong evidence that GATT disciplines promoted market efficiency in both the world beef and 
wheat markets.  Long-run price transmission elasticity increased and the speed at which the 
market adjusted to departures from its long-run equilibrium more than doubled under the GATT 
regime.  Within the Pacific market price transmission elasticity between Australia and U.S. beef 
price improved and adjustment toward equilibrium is much faster under the GATT regime.  
Between the Pacific and Atlantic beef market GATT reforms corrected the corrupt (inverse) 
relationship between the Australian and Argentine beef price, and increased the speed of 
adjustment.  The same improvement in the price transmission elasticity and speed of adjustment 
is shown in the case of wheat.  
Variance decomposition shows better market integration under the GATT regime, with 
more widespread and faster transmission of unexpected shocks across different prices in both the 
beef and wheat markets.  
Furthermore, the variance decomposition suggests that with better market integration 
under the GATT regime, prices exhibit more simultaneity.  That is, under GATT a larger 
proportion of price variability is explained by shocks in other prices in the market than own shocks.  This is particularly true to the Australia beef price since it can be considered as the 
residual supplier of beef in the world.    Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
  α 0=α T=0  α 0≠ 0, α T=0  α 0≠ 0, α T≠ 0 
  Test Stat  Cri Val  Test Stat  Cri Val  Test Stat  Cri Val 
Beef  Price        
      United  States  0.536 -1.942 -3.759 -2.882 -3.389 -3.442 
      Australia  -0.552 -1.942 -0.542 -2.882 -2.064 -3.442 
      Argentina  0.642 -1.945 -1.349 -2.904 -1.352 -3.476 
        
Wheat  Price        
      United  States  -0.629 -1.941 -3.552 -2.870 -3.489 -3.425 
      Australia  -0.321 -1.941 -2.901 -2.870 -2.987 -3.425 
      Argentina  -0.351 -1.941 -2.788 -2.875 -2.908 -3.431 
 
 
Table 2. Johansen Cointegration test 
  Maximal Eigenvalue  Trace of Stochastic Matrix 
Null and Alternative  Test Stat  Critival Value  Test Stat  Critival Value 
   Beef AU-US Pre-GATT         
      0 vs 1  18.370  10.600  24.000  13.310 
      1 vs 2   5.630  2.710  5.630  2.710 
   Beef AU-US Post-GATT         
      0 vs 1  20.870  10.600  23.160  13.310 
      1 vs 2   2.290  2.710  2.290  2.710 
   Wheat AU-US Pre-GATT         
      0 vs 1  9.870  7.370  9.900  10.350 
      1 vs 2   0.030  2.980  0.030  2.980 
   Wheat AU-US Post-GATT         
      0 vs 1  22.100  7.370  29.840  10.350 
      1 vs 2   7.740  2.980  7.740  2.980 
Significance level at 10 percent 
 
 
Table 3. Long-run relationship and speed of adjustment 
 Pre-GATT  GATT 
Variables  Long-run Speed Long-run Speed 
Pacific Beef Market         




Atlantic Beef Market         




Wheat  Market      
   AU-US Wheat Price  1.020  0.064 
1.161 
1.075 0.414 
2.845 Table 4. Variance decomposition for the beef market  
 Pre-GATT  GATT 
 US Beef Price 
Variability 
AU Beef Price 
Variability 
US Beef Price 
Variability 




















1 100.000 0.000 0.000  100.000  100.000 0.000 0.000  100.000 
2  95.799 4.201 0.038 99.962 77.135 22.865 2.669 97.331 
3  95.557 4.443 2.872 97.128 74.111 25.889 11.524 88.476 
4  95.003 4.997 6.288 93.712 74.976 25.024 11.609 88.391 
5  94.627 5.373 6.425 93.575 72.883 27.117 14.132 85.868 
6  94.204 5.796 10.454 89.546 75.183 24.817 14.058 85.942 
7  88.390 11.611 12.904 87.096 75.074 24.926 23.343 76.657 
8  86.627 13.373 13.146 86.854 74.769 25.231 33.868 66.132 
9  86.789 13.211 13.107 86.893 74.462 25.538 33.719 66.281 
10 85.977 14.023 13.898 86.102 75.478 24.522 44.446 55.554 
11 85.993 14.007 14.095 85.906 74.547 25.453 45.609 54.391 





Table 5. Variance decomposition for the wheat market 
 Pre-GATT  GATT 
 US Wheat Price 
Variability 
AU Wheat Price 
Variability 
US Wheat Price 
Variability 




















1 100.000 0.000 0.000  100.000  100.000 0.000 0.000  100.000 
2  90.099 9.901 9.063 90.937 64.922 35.078 53.427 46.573 
3  84.401 15.599 10.788 89.212 64.763 35.237 53.493 46.507 
4  82.407 17.593 10.946 89.054 63.558 36.442 54.345 45.655 
5  82.288 17.712 10.971 89.029 63.723 36.277 54.591 45.409 
6  81.496 18.504 10.959 89.041 63.042 36.958 55.203 44.797 
7  80.401 19.599 14.196 85.804 63.490 36.510 55.668 44.332 
8  80.114 19.886 14.660 85.340 61.815 38.185 55.414 44.586 
9  80.271 19.729 15.952 84.048 59.155 40.845 54.550 45.450 
10 80.186 19.814 15.988 84.012 58.719 41.281 54.500 45.500 
11 80.325 19.675 16.381 83.619 58.567 41.433 53.773 46.227 
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